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Introduction 
 
The past two decades have seen both a resurgence and transformation of research 
on linguistic relativity. This is due in large part to the influential work of re-
searchers such as Lucy (1992a, 1992b) and Levinson (1997, 2003, inter alia). 
Research on linguistic relativity has morphed from the Whorfian (1956), often 
anecdotally based enterprise, into one that is oriented around experiments of 
various sorts conducted among speakers of different languages. These languages 
are frequently the topic of inquiry because of some specific grammatical features 
they contain, features that potentially affect speakers’ cognitive orientations vis-à-
vis a given semantic domain. Research of this type has resulted in evidence for 
language-mediated or influenced thought in a wide array of nonlinguistic tasks 
related to numeric cognition (De Cruz and Pica 2008, Pica et al. 2004), gender 
perception (Konishi 1993, Flaherty 2001), spatial and directional construal 
(Levinson 2003), substance classification (Lucy and Gaskins 2001, Imai and 
Mazuka 2007), the perception of time (Boroditsky et al. 2011, Boroditsky 2001), 
and even the perception of colors (Gilbert et al. 2006, Drivonikou et al. 2007). 
In their review of recent work on linguistic relativity, Wolff and Holmes 
(2010:1) make the following observation: 
 
While we do not find support for the idea that language determines the basic categories of 
thought or that it overwrites preexisting conceptual distinctions, we do find support for 
the proposal that language can make some distinctions difficult to avoid, as well as for 
the proposal that language can augment certain types of thinking. 
 
                                                
1 The author wishes to thank those Pirahã who participated in this study. He is particularly grateful 
as well to Keren Madora, who translated for him during research among the people, and who 
discussed many of the ideas presented in this work. 
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In this paper I will focus on a particular cognitive domain, namely numeric 
representation. For the data considered, pertaining to an indigenous Amazonian 
language well known to most linguists (see e.g. D. Everett 2009), we will see that 
there is considerable support for the notion that language can augment certain 
kinds of thinking. In particular, a certain linguistic feature, viz. number terminol-
ogy, can serve as a ‘conceptual tool’ (Wolff and Holmes 2010) that augments a 
certain kind of thinking, numeric cognition. The data suggest that when speakers 
lack number terminology they struggle with basic quantity recognition tasks, and 
therefore that number terminology augments in a critical fashion numeric think-
ing. 
 
1 Linguistic Effects on Numeric Cognition: Potential Test Cases 
 
Work related to numeric cognition and the linguistic relativity hypothesis has 
generally focused on languages with very modest, or completely absent, systems 
for expressing cardinal numerosities (De Cruz and Pica 2008). For example, the 
results in Pica et al. (2004) suggest that speakers of Mundurukú tend to struggle 
with tasks that require precise representation of numerosities greater than three, a 
fact that is most plausibly motivated by the paucity of number terms in that 
language.  
As Hammarström (2010) notes, there is only a handful of languages that can 
truly be considered anumeric. Perhaps the most well-documented case is that of 
Pirahã, a language spoken in southwest Amazonia that lacks any precise number 
words (D. Everett 2005). In that language, hói signifies “small size or amount,” 
hoí indicates “somewhat larger size or amount,” and baágiso means to “cause to 
come together” or “many.” The imprecision of these terms is demonstrated 
experimentally in Frank et al. (2008). In other less well-documented cases anu-
mericity has been claimed, though experimental work is still required to buttress 
such claims. For example Xilixana is another South American language that is 
said to lack all number words, including ‘one’ (Hammarström 2010). Another 
Amazonian language that is claimed to lack native number words altogether is 
Jarawara (Dixon 2004), a member of the small Arawá family. However, follow-
up work has suggested conclusively that native number words do exist in Jara-
wara (C. Everett, under review), and in all well-documented Arawá languages. 
Given that the absence of numerals in Pirahã is now so clearly documented, 
this case is arguably crucial to our understanding of the potential effects of 
anumeric language on numeric cognition. To date, three extensive experimental 
studies have been undertaken in an attempt to better understand the role of 
number terms on the basic recognition, recall, and manipulation of quantities. 
Below I synthesize some of the major findings from these studies, including my 
own. I also present new data on very recent work among the people. I will claim 
that the results so far obtained among these people are consistent with the notion 
that number terminology can serve as a ‘conceptual tool,’ and that the data present 
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a clear example in which language serves a fundamental role in augmenting 
certain cognitive abilities, in this case the ability to exactly recognize quantities 
exceeding three. To that extent, these data can be added to the growing literature 
providing evidence for linguistic effects on facets of non-linguistic cognition. 
 
2 A Summary of Results Across Three Studies 
 
Frank et al. (2008) conducted two word-elicitation tasks that corroborated D. 
Everett’s (2005) claims that the three aforementioned number-like terms cannot 
actually be considered number words, at least not ones denoting precise numerosi-
ties. In one task, Pirahã speakers were presented first with one spool of thread, 
and asked to provide a number term for the quantity provided. In every case they 
used the word hói. The researchers then added spools of thread to the presented 
array iteratively, and after each spool was added asked the participants to identify 
the new quantity. This task was termed the ‘increasing quantity’ elicitation task. 
For this task the speakers did use hoí in all cases in which two spools of thread 
were presented. However, they also used this term to refer to as many as seven 
spools of thread. They employed baágiso to refer to quantities ranging from three 
to ten spools. In the second task, Pirahã speakers were presented first with ten 
spools of thread, and asked to name this quantity. In most cases they provided 
baágiso, though they also used hoí in some cases. The researchers then subtracted 
spools of thread iteratively, and after each spool was subtracted asked the partici-
pants to identify the new quantity. Baágiso was used for quantities ranging from 
seven to ten spools, hoí was used for four to ten spools, while hói was utilized for 
one to six items. These findings support Everett’s (2005) claim that these words 
are not precise number terms, and suggest that Pirahã may be the most anumeric 
language documented in the literature. 
Gordon (2004) performed a series of quantity recognition tasks among the 
speakers of two villages. These tasks included a basic one-to-one recognition task, 
an orthogonal matching task, and a brief-presentation/hidden matching task. For 
the one-to-one matching task, the Pirahã were individually presented with an 
evenly-spaced line of objects and asked to produce a matching line of objects of a 
different type parallel to the presented line. For the hidden matching task, stimuli 
were presented and shortly thereafter concealed. For the orthogonal matching 
task, a line of stimuli was placed in front of each participant, perpendicular to the 
line then produced by the participants. The coefficient of variation (standard 
deviation of responses divided by mean for each set size) of the Pirahã responses 
generally hovered at 0.15 for all tasks. This figure is generally suggestive of 
analog-estimation strategies on the part of the Pirahã matching the quantities 
(Weber’s law). 
Frank et al. (2008) replicated Gordon’s one-to-one matching, orthogonal 
matching, and hidden matching experiments among the Pirahã. They employed 
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the same general methods used by Gordon (2004). For each of the tasks, they 
presented the Pirahã with an array of spools of thread, and the participants were 
asked to match the array with a line of empty rubber balloons. The Pirahã were 
tested individually, and in all cases the tasks were modeled for them by the 
researchers prior to individual trials. In general, their results were consistent with 
Gordon’s (2004)—the people’s performance generally deteriorated as the quantity 
in question was increased. Crucially, however, the authors failed to replicate the 
most extreme finding in Gordon (2004), specifically that the Pirahã struggle with 
the mere recognition of exact quantities greater than three. In fact, the Pirahã they 
tested were generally quite adept at matching a presented array of spools with an 
equal array of balloons when no spatial re-orientation or mental recollection of the 
stimuli was required. 
Given the importance of the Pirahã case to the discussion of linguistic effects 
on numeric cognition, and given the crucial difference between the previous sets 
of results, I helped perform a series of tasks among a group of speakers not tested 
in either previous study. Three of these tasks were exact methodological replica-
tions of the tasks described in Frank et al. (2008), based as well on the three tasks 
from Gordon (2004) described above. A few of the tasks were quite different in 
that they employed cross-modal stimuli. The latter tasks were relatively modest in 
scope, and are described in 3. The former were more extensive, and the results 
obtained for them are described in detail in C. Everett and Madora (in press). Next 
I summarize the relevant data for these three replication tasks.  
For all three tasks, the speakers were presented with uniformly-spaced lines of 
spools of thread, and asked to match those lines with equal lines of rubber bal-
loons. These objects are familiar to the people, having been used as trade goods 
previously. Most crucially these objects were chosen since they were utilized in 
Frank et al. (2008) and C. Everett and Madora (in press) sought to replicate 
exactly the findings of that study. Just as in Gordon (2004), for the basic matching 
task the stimuli were presented on a table in front of the seated participants, 
parallel to the edge of the table. In the case of the orthogonal matching task, the 
spools were placed orthogonally to the edge of the table (in line with the partici-
pants’ sagittal plane), and the speakers were asked to match the quantity of spools 
in a straight line parallel to the edge. For the hidden matching task, a line of 
spools of thread was presented parallel to the edge of the table, and after several 
seconds the line was covered by a sheet of cardboard. The participants were asked 
to place a matching line of balloons on the opposite side of the cardboard, parallel 
to the presented line of spools.  
For the sake of greater methodological clarity, in (1) I provide a picture of a 
correctly-matched line of stimuli. This picture represents one of 56 documented 
trials for this task.  
 
 
 
Linguistic Relativity and Numeric Cognition 
 95 
   (1)  Example of basic one-to-one matching task. Correct response for a trial 
with eight target stimuli. 
 
 
 
 
Seven Pirahã adults participated in Gordon (2004). A total of fourteen adults 
participated in Frank et al. (2008), and fourteen different speakers participated in 
C. Everett and Madora (in press). For the orthogonal matching task, 24/56 trials in 
C. Everett and Madora (in press) contained correct responses in which the Pirahã 
matched the presented stimuli with an array equal in number. This is the identical 
ratio of correct responses for that task in Frank et al. (2008). For the hidden 
matching task, 24/56 trials in C. Everett and Madora (in press) and Frank et al. 
(2008) contained correct responses. For the one-to-one matching task, however, 
54/56 trials in Frank et al. (2008) contained correct responses, while only 32/56 
did in C. Everett and Madora (in press). When individuals’ proportions of correct 
responses were contrasted, the difference between the results of the two studies 
were found to be highly significant in the case of the one-to-one matching task 
(t(13), p = 0.000). When this metric was used to contrast the Pirahãs’ responses 
across the two other tasks, the differences across studies were not found to be 
significant (p>0.05 in each case). 
The coefficient of variation for all the tasks in Gordon (2004), C. Everett and 
Madora (in press) hovered around 0.15, consistent with the use of analog estima-
tion by the people (rather than task incomprehension). This coefficient was also 
obtained in Frank et al. (2008), with the exception of the basic matching task. 
In short, the results in C. Everett and Madora (in press) for the orthogonal-
matching and hidden-matching tasks are very similar to those in Frank et al. 
(2008). They are also similar to those in Gordon (2004), as evidenced by similar 
proportions of correct responses calculated according to set size. This is apparent 
in the second box of Figure (2). The results in C. Everett and Madora (in press) 
for the basic matching task, which did not involve recall or spatial manipulation, 
are similar to those in Gordon (2004), but not Frank et al. (2008) as is apparent in 
Caleb Everett 
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the first box of Figure (2). In general, the results for all three studies suggest that 
the speakers of this anumeric language struggle with the recognition of exact 
correspondences between numerosities over three. In 4 we offer an explanation of 
the disparate results in Frank et al. (2008) vis-à-vis the basic matching task. First, 
though, we provide additional findings recently gathered among the people. 
 
   (2)  Proportions of correct responses for various matching tasks. (Taken from 
C. Everett and Madora, in press.) 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Gordon (2004) one-to-one
Frank et al. (2008) one-to-one
Authors one-to-one
 
 
 
0
0.2
0.4
0.6
0.8
1
0 1 2 3 4 5 6 7 8 9 10
Gordon (2004) orthogonal
Frank et al. (2008) orthogonal
Authors orthogonal
Gordon (2004) hidden
Frank et al. (2008) hidden
Authors hidden
 
 
 
 
 
Target set size  
Proportion 
correct 
Basic matching task 
 
More involved matching tasks 
Target set size  
Proportion 
correct 
Linguistic Relativity and Numeric Cognition 
 97 
3 New Cross-modal Data 
 
One criticism that could be made of the previous studies of Pirahã numeric 
cognition, including C. Everett and Madora (in press), is that they rely exclusively 
on data of a specific kind. For all studies the Pirahã speakers were asked to 
perform a visual-tactile task that does not appeal to the auditory modality. While 
the results of the studies are consistent with the implementation of analog estima-
tion during the tasks, rather than task-comprehension failure, one wonders wheth-
er the Pirahãs’ performance might benefit from a greater array of cross-modal 
tasks. To begin exploring this issue, I conducted two brief tasks with ten Pirahã 
speakers. Only a modest number of trials were conducted for each of these tasks, 
due to a limited window for research with the Pirahã in question.2 Nevertheless, 
the results of these tasks are worth discussing here since they yield further support 
for the suggestions in C. Everett and Madora (in press) and Gordon (2004) that 
the Pirahã struggle with simple quantity recognition. 
The two tasks I conducted involved physical actions, and in one case auditory 
stimuli. The tasks were: (a) stomping-with-log repetition and (b) rowing action 
repetition. In the case of both tasks, the Pirahã participants were asked to repeat as 
closely as possible the actions performed by myself. For the stomping-with-log 
repetition task, I created a series of booming noises by simultaneously stomping 
my right foot and smashing a narrow log on the ground. The participant was then 
asked to repeat the action. The task was first modeled between myself and another 
non-Pirahã, in an attempt to make it clear that the objective of the task was to 
imitate the number of stomping actions. While this task may seem somewhat 
esoteric, it was chosen because it employs auditory and kinesthetic information 
and relates to a behavior common to Pirahã culture. During the ‘dance’ that takes 
place throughout the night during full moons, the people have often been ob-
served to stomp out a series of noises, with their foot and with a narrow log 
simultaneously, while walking in a circle. Given their familiarity with this motion, 
and given the somewhat rhythmic nature of the stomping that occurs during the 
‘dance,’ it seemed natural to utilize this motion experimentally. 
The second task also involved a behavior that is familiar to all Pirahã, rowing 
with a paddle. For this task, I created a series of rowing motions with a paddle, 
alternating from side-to-side. The participant was then asked to mimic my actions. 
The entire task was once again modeled by myself and another non-Pirahã, until it 
seemed clear that the number of rowing actions was of interest. A pause was 
made between each rowing action, ostensibly so that the actions would be per-
ceived as discrete units. This task was also selected because it represents a behav-
ior that is common to Pirahã culture. The Pirahã, who are uniformly excellent 
rowers, are often observed paddling with a series of symmetrical motions. Given 
                                                
2 Access to the speakers of this language is generally quite limited for a variety of reasons. In the 
case of these cross-modal tasks, I was limited to one day for the experiments. 
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this fact, I imagined that the frequently symmetrical nature of canoe rowing might 
facilitate their ability to recall and store the number of actions witnessed. 
I suspected that, because these two tasks involved behaviors that were com-
paratively common to Pirahã culture, when contrasted to those in C. Everett and 
Madora (in press), Gordon (2004), and Frank et al. (2008), and because they 
involved actions of a different modality, their number recall for the tasks might 
show improvement. Based on the few dozen trials I have so far conducted, these 
suspicions are far from confirmed. In fact, the performance of the Pirahã on these 
trials suggests that they face even greater difficulties with these sorts of tasks, 
perhaps since they involve some recollection or perhaps because the request made 
of them is so unfamiliar (despite the familiarity of the action).  
For both tasks, all ten speakers tested presented the correct number of actions 
only in the case of the number one. That is, if one stomping or rowing action was 
produced by myself, one stomping or rowing action was then produced by the 
participant. For numbers greater than two, however, incorrect responses outnum-
bered correct responses in all cases. The responses for the rowing-action task 
contained enough errors to suggest task incomprehension, but only for numerosi-
ties greater than two. 
For the stomping-action task, I tested numbers from 1-5. The means of the 
answers, according to each target size (number of stomping-actions produced by 
experimenter), were as follows: 1:1, 2:3.75, 3:4.25, 4:4.75, and 5:6.5.  In other 
words, the magnitude of errors was generally quite high for numbers 2-5. For 
instance, when five stomping actions were produced by myself, the average 
number of response actions was 6.5. As the number of target actions increased, 
however, so did the number of participant actions. This suggests that the partici-
pants did recognize an increase in the quantity of actions and attempted to match 
the quantity, albeit imprecisely. 
These cross-modal data, while modest in scope, suggest strongly that speakers 
of Pirahã struggle with recognizing or recalling the exact number of actions 
witnessed. It is worth mentioning that I have also utilized other tasks involving a 
variety of other actions (e.g. clapping) with a smaller set of speakers, and have yet 
to observe anything that would lead me to suspect that some other cross-modal 
task might exist for which the Pirahã would demonstrate heightened quantity 
recognition.3 In short, the data so far collected among the speakers of this anumer-
ic language suggest that they struggle with exact quantity recognition. The only 
exception to this trend in the experimental data is the finding in Frank et al. 
(2008) vis-à-vis simple one-to-one matching. We are naturally left to wonder 
what might account for the disparate findings in that study.  
One possibility is that the findings in Frank et al. (2008) were due to greater 
clarity on the part of the experimenters, i.e. that the Pirahã tested in the remaining 
studies were confused by the tasks in a way that those tested in Frank et al. (2008) 
                                                
3 Such observations are consistent with the fact that many previous attempts at teaching math skills 
among the people have failed. (D. Everett 2005) 
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were not. However, given that the other studies relied on a fluent translator, given 
that their results were characterized by relatively constant coefficients of variation 
(inconsistent with task incomprehension), and given that the results across control 
tasks for all studies are so similar, this possibility is highly improbable. One 
plausible account of this disparity requires some elaboration of the setting of the 
research conducted for Frank et al. (2008), which is provided next. 
 
4 Variation Across Villages? 
 
The approximately 700 Pirahã are dispersed over numerous villages along the 
Maicí. These villages are typically small, most often with a dozen or so adults. 
The territory of the people stretches south from the mouth of the river to the point 
at which the river is crossed by a federal highway (BR 230), which is actually a 
dirt road through the jungle. There are several villages within 20 km of this road. 
Two of these were used as locations for the research in Gordon (2004) and a third 
was used in our own research. The latter village is located at 748´ S, 6220´ W, 
and is nearly adjacent to a bridge crossing the Maici river.4 The data presented in 
Frank et al. (2008) were based on research in another location, the Xagiopai 
village. Xagiopai is located about 50 km from BR 230, at 721´ S,  6216´W. 
All of the Pirahã remain almost exclusively monolingual despite contact with 
Brazilians for over two centuries. (See D. Everett 2005.) In the case of the Pirahã 
living near BR 230, this contact is primarily with transient Brazilians. The case at 
Xagiopai is much different, however. FUNAI (the Brazilian indigenous agency) 
and FUNASA (the Brazilian health organization) have maintained relatively 
extensive operations in the village for over a decade. The Xagiopai village is the 
only Pirahã village with such prominent government presence, and is also the 
village in which an SIL linguist, Keren Madora, resided during the early-to-mid 
2000’s. Unbeknownst to the authors of Frank et al. (2008), one of the primary foci 
of Madora was to teach the Pirahã how to count. To that end, she employed 
numerous quantity recognition tasks, of the sort she helped develop for Gordon 
(2004:496). Crucially, she also introduced various numeric neologisms into the 
language. This was the first time this had been done in the language. According to 
Madora, the performance of the Pirahã improved if they learned these neologisms.  
Given these facts, it is less surprising that the Pirahã at Xagiopai did much 
better on the one-to-one match documented in Frank et al. (2008), when contrast-
ed with those documented in the other relevant studies. Admittedly I cannot be 
certain that the disparate performance in Frank et al. (2008) was due to the 
neologisms coined by Madora. Nevertheless, at present I believe that this is the 
most plausible interpretation of the data (see C. Everett and Madora in press). 
  
 
                                                
4 The experiments took place in a Brazilian-owned house dozens of meters off the reservation. 
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5 Discussion and Conclusion 
 
Studies such as Wynn (1992), Lipton and Spelke (2003), and Xu and Spelke 
(2000) suggest that pre-linguistic infants are capable of exactly recognizing exact 
quantities less than three, and are also capable of approximating larger quantities. 
These abilities appear to be based on two distinct neurophysiological systems, as 
evidenced in Dehaene et al. (1999) and Lemer et al. (2003), inter alia. Carey 
(2001) and others have suggested that number words serve a crucial ontogenetic 
purpose, namely to conjoin these two core systems. The Pirahã data are consistent 
with these results from the developmental literature.  
The absence of number words in Pirahã is, according to D. Everett (2005, 
2009), the result of general cultural constraints that result in a series of other 
typologically-remarkable features in this language. Were the Pirahã familiarized 
with such words as children they would undoubtedly excel at the tasks described 
here. The people have clearly been reluctant to borrow such words or systemati-
cally incorporate numeric neologisms. This reluctance stands in stark contrast to 
other cultures with modest number systems, which have typically adopted number 
terms from other languages. It is important to stress that the Pirahã excel in their 
environment, and that they show relatively little interest in the very acquisition 
the ‘tool’ of number terminology, much as they have little interest in most tools 
and artifacts offered by outsiders for which, according to them, they would have 
little use (D. Everett 2005). In short, while I believe the data discussed here are 
consistent with relativistic effects, it is important to recognize that these effects 
could arguably be due, ultimately, to a more general cultural factor, namely the 
opposition to the incorporation of number words into their language. 
The data discussed here are consistent with the notion that speakers of an 
anumeric language lack a ‘conceptual tool,’ a series of number words, which is 
nearly universal to all cultures. The lack of this linguistic/conceptual tool appar-
ently results in strong cognitive effects when the quantity-recognition abilities of 
speakers of such a language are contrasted with the abilities of the speakers of a 
numeric language. More generally, since a particular feature of the Pirahã lan-
guage, namely anumericity, apparently has demonstrable effects on non-linguistic 
cognition, namely number recognition, the data discussed above add to the 
growing literature on the linguistic relativity hypothesis. 
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